

IN THE CHANCERY COURT FOR KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE

PART I

ENTERED

NOV 23 2020

MEGHAN CONLEY,

Plaintiff,

HOWARD G. HOGAN

v.

No. 197897-1

KNOX COUNTY SHERIFF
TOM SPANGLER,

Defendant.


ORDER

In accordance with the transcript of the court's bench opinion, attached hereto as an exhibit and adopted and incorporated herein, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:

1. That paragraph 3 on page 40 of the Court's Memorandum Opinion filed April 9, 2020, and paragraph 3 of the Court's order entered April 9, 2020, is changed to read as follows:
 - (3) That the KCSO is prohibited from treating a written request for inspection or copies generally phrased in terms of information sought as insufficient for lack of specificity or detail automatically because the written request is generally phrased in terms of information sought;
2. That, except as provided above, the defendant's MOTION filed May 8, 2020, TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT is denied;
3. That the costs of this case are taxed to the defendant in his official capacity and

not as an individual.

Enter this 23rd day of November, 2020.


CHANCELLOR

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing was placed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid to:

Andrew C. Fels, Esq.
125 S. Central Street, Suite 203
Knoxville, TN 37902

Dean Hill Rivkin, Esq.
6608 Crystal Lake Drive
Knoxville, TN 37919

Amanda Lynn Morse
Deputy Law Director
400 Main Street, Suite 612
Knoxville, TN 37902

David L. Buuck
Knox County Law Director
400 Main Street, Suite 612
Knoxville, TN 37902

This 24th day of November, 2020.

Howard G. Hogan / S. Fairbanks
Howard G. Hogan
Clerk and Master

IN THE CHANCERY COURT FOR KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE

PART I

ENTERED

NOV 24 2020

MEGHAN CONLEY,

Plaintiff,

HOWARD G. HOGAN

v.

No. 197897-1

**KNOX COUNTY SHERIFF
TOM SPANGLER,**

Defendant.


ORDER

In accordance with the court's Memorandum Opinion, filed contemporaneously herewith, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:

- (1) That the Court's Memorandum Opinion, filed contemporaneously herewith, is adopted and incorporated herein by reference;
- (2) That the Court's Memorandum Opinion filed April 9, 2020, and Order entered April 9, 2020, are amended to conform with this order and the Memorandum Opinion filed herewith;
- (3) That petitioner is awarded expenses, in the amount of \$2,805.25, from the defendant, in his official capacity and not his individual capacity;
- (4) That petitioner is awarded attorney's fees for Andrew C. Fels, attorney at law, in the amount of \$55,762.50 from defendant, in his official capacity and not his individual capacity;

- (5) That petitioner is awarded attorney's fees for Dean Hill Rivkin, attorney at law, in the amount of \$19,440.00, from defendant, in his official capacity and not his individual capacity;
- (6) That petitioner's motion to alter or amend filed May 11, 2020, is granted to the extent set forth above and is otherwise denied; and
- (7) That the court costs are taxed to defendant, in his official capacity and not his individual capacity.

Enter this 24th day of November, 2020.


CHANCELLOR

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing was placed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid to:

Andrew C. Fels, Esq.
125 S. Central Street, Suite 203
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This 24th day of November, 2020.

Howard Hogan S. Lumbani S.
Howard G. Hogan
Clerk and Master

FILED
IN THE CHANCERY COURT FOR KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE

PART I 2020 NOV 24 PM 1:14

HOWARD G. HOGAN

MEGHAN CONLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

No. 197897-1

KNOX COUNTY SHERIFF

TOM SPANGLER,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This public records case is before the Court on Meghan Conley's ("Petitioner") motion for reasonable costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505. Petitioner's motion is titled, "MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT TO INCLUDE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND DISCRETIONARY COSTS. ("motion to alter or amend")." The Court previously found that Petitioner was entitled to an award of costs, including attorney's fees, in obtaining the relief given in paragraphs 2 and 4 of its order entered April 29, 2020. Her motion to alter or amend appears to be an application for costs as well as to expand the criteria in the court's order of April 29, 2020, for the awarding of the costs. The Court held hearings on the motion on July 2, 2020 and August 6, 2020. The transcript for the hearing of July 2, 2020 has been filed. In the event the record for this matter is assembled, the Court requests and directs that the transcript of the hearing of August 6, 2020 to likewise be filed.

At the hearing on August 6, 2020, counsel for Knox County Sheriff Tom Spangler (“Defendant”) agreed that the Court’s finding “that the criteria of Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(g) is sustained for awarding reasonable costs, including attorney’s fees, to Professor Conley [Petitioner]” is sufficient. In other words, Defendant’s counsel agreed that the Court did not have to use the language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(g), i.e. “knew that such record was public and willfully refused to disclose it,” to premise its award of reasonable costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees. However, that does not mean that the Defendant’s counsel otherwise agreed to the awarding of costs, including attorney’s fees, or to the amount of attorney’s fees or expenses.

In her PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT filed July 30, 2020, Petitioner seeks fees and expenses for her attorneys, Andrew C. Fels and Dean Hill Rivkin, in the amount of \$102,460. Mr. Rivkin joined Mr. Fels as co-counsel, post judgment, after Petitioner filed her motion to alter or amend on May 11, 2020. Petitioner’s original motion sought the total amount of \$59,208.65 in attorney’s fees and \$1535.05 in court reporter and transcript costs. Petitioner filed Mr. Fels’ itemized statement for his fees and court reporter and transcript costs together with copies of court reporters’ invoices. Subsequently, with the contest over the recoverable costs, including attorney’s fees, and the addition of co-counsel, the amount of attorney’s fees increased significantly.

Petitioner argued that the Court should use the Lodestar approach for determining her entitlement to attorney’s fees for the case as a whole. *See Hensley v. Eckerthart*, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). Under Petitioner’s Lodestar theory, the court would determine the reasonableness of the rates charged and the reasonableness of the hours expended. However, the Tennessee Supreme Court declined to adopt this approach in *United Med. ex*

rel. *Wright v. Wright*, 337 S.W.3d 166 (Tenn. 2011). The *Wright* Court pointed out the problematic nature of the Lodestar approach and noted that:

The time and energy expended in the performance of client services are essential elements which must be considered in setting reasonable fees-but, if time is the singular calculation, inexperience, inefficiency, and incompetence may be rewarded while skillful and expeditious disposition of litigation is penalized unfairly.

Wright, 337 S.W.3d at 180 (quoting *Adams v. Underkircher*, 1985 OK 96, 714 P.2d 193, 197 (Okla. 1985)). Instead, the *Wright* Court noted that Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) (hereinafter referred to as “RPC 1.5(a)”) already includes a Lodestar analysis in that the factors of RPC 1.5(a) include an analysis of the time and labor involved in the case and the fee customarily charged in the locality. *Id.* at 179-80. However, the *Wright* Court declined to make the Lodestar analysis the paramount or exclusive consideration and directed trial courts to utilize all the factors of RPC 1.5(a) in the determination of whether a requested attorney’s fee is reasonable. *Id.* at 180. The *Wright* Court further noted the following:

Regardless of the approach used, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee is still a subjective judgment based on evidence and the experience of the trier of facts, and the reasonableness of the fee must depend upon the particular circumstances of the individual case.

Id. at 180-81 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Defendant takes the position that all costs, including attorney fees, should be disallowed or that “the court could allocate the total fee amongst each public record request identified by the petitioner in the LURR [Petitioner’s List of Unfilled Records Request]” as sustained or denied by the court. This position is located in Defendant’s MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT’S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES, p.11, filed

July 30, 2020. In other words, Defendant's approach is for the court to determine the total amount of reasonable costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, and then award 2/12 (or 1/6) of that amount. Defendant proffers the same allocation for the expenses. However, defendant's approach appears to run contrary to the Tennessee Court of Appeals' opinion in the case cited by both parties, *Little v. City of Chattanooga*, No. E2013-00838-COA-R3-CV, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. February 14, 2014).

Initially, this Court shared Defendant's view of the award provision of the Tennessee Public Records Act and its application to this case: that Petitioner could only receive reasonable costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred for the specific records obtained. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(g). In this regard, Defendant relies on Tennessee Court of Appeals' opinions in cases such as *Schneider v. City of Jackson*, No. W2005-01234-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 405, 2006 WL 1644369 (Ct. App. June 14, 2006) and *Friedman v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, No. M2012-00212-COA-R3-CV, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 150, 2013 WL 784584 (Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2013).

First, Defendant relies on the Court of Appeals decision in *Schneider v. City of Jackson*, for an illustration that the Court of Appeals analyzed two categories of documents in a records request separately and determined the appropriateness of the award of attorneys' fees as it related to the separate categories. In the *Schneider* case, two categories of documents were requested by the petitioner which were subsequently denied, police field interview cards and financial documents relating to a license agreement between the municipal government and a private baseball franchise. *Schneider*, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 405 at *3. The trial court in that case awarded attorneys' fees for both of the claims; however, that award was comprised of two separate awards for the individual categories of

documents. *Id.* at *23-24. The Court of Appeals analyzed each category separately to determine whether the request had been willfully denied which in turn triggered the appropriateness of the attorneys' fees award. *Id.* at *52-68. The Court of Appeals mainly analyzed and focused on the willfulness of the denials. This Court has resolved that issue in favor of the Petitioner. However, it is important to note that the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal's decision and reinstated the trial court's award of attorneys' fees. *See Schneider v. Jackson*, 226 S.W.3d 332, 349 (Tenn. 2007). This reinstatement of the trial court's award implicitly upheld the trial court's decision to split, or apportion, the attorneys' fees between the two separate categories.

Second, Defendant relies on the Court of Appeals decision in *Friedmann v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, for further support of the proposal to apportion the attorneys' fees by successful claims. That case also involved two categories of document requests, settlement agreements and settlement reports. *Friedmann*, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 150. at *2. The Court of Appeals found that the law was well settled regarding the disclosure of settlement agreements and that a failure to disclose the settlement agreements constituted a willful refusal as required for the award of attorneys' fees under the Act. *Id.* at *33. However, the nondisclosure of the settlement reports was not a willful refusal because it was a "close call" on whether the settlement reports were subject to disclosure. *Id.* at *34. That court affirmed the award of attorneys' fees as it pertained to the settlement agreements. *Id.* However, that court limited the attorneys' fees on appeal and held that the petitioner was not entitled to recover the fees incurred that pertain to the settlement reports. *Id.* at *35. More succinctly, the Court of Appeals stated: "we find the petitioner is entitled to recover attorney's fees and expenses incurred on appeal to the extent they pertain to the settlement

agreements, but not the settlement reports.” *Id.* at *2. Again, the Court of Appeals was mainly focused on the willfulness aspect of the nondisclosures to trigger the awards provisions. As stated before, that issue is no longer before this Court.

Among the public records opinions, the one most apropos to the situation before this Court is that of the Tennessee Court of Appeals in *Little v. City of Chattanooga, supra*. In *Little*, the petitioner successfully appealed the case twice. In the first appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the Chancellor erred because he “did not apply the statute properly” and “improperly focused on the amount of documents produced by the City rather than ‘on whether proper procedure was followed or the withholding was justified.’” *Little*, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 at *4. The Court concluded that the petitioner “should be compensated for her time and money expended to enforce her right to access the public records she sought.” *Id.*

As a result of the first appeal, the court remanded the case “to the trial court for a determination of the amount of fees to be awarded to Ms. Little.” *Id.* On remand, the Chancellor reduced the fees and expenses claimed by the petitioner. *Id.* at *7-8. On the second appeal, the Court of Appeals found the Chancellor’s reductions to be in error and remanded the case with instructions to the Chancellor to enter an award to “Ms. Little for all of her reasonable fees and expenses requested, for a total of \$71,343.18.” *Id.* at *21-23.

In addition to the production of the emails and the implementation of a system for access to arrest records, as set out in paragraphs (2) & (4) of the Court’s order entered April 9, 2020, this case heavily concerned Defendant’s methods and procedures for addressing Petitioner’s requests for public records. The case before this Court, like *Little*, was as much

or more concerned with the methods and procedures utilized by Defendant in addressing Petitioner's records requests as with the specific documents obtained.

In addition to the fees and expenses sought for the case in chief, Petitioner seeks attorney's fees and expenses for recovering her original fees and expenses. On the other hand, Defendant argues that no basis exists in the law for Petitioner to recover any attorney's fees or expenses on her claim for attorney's fees and expenses.

Petitioner engaged Andrew C. Fels on a *pro bono* basis after a friend of Petitioner put her in contact with Mr. Fels. The representation agreement was memorialized in a written Retainer Agreement. This agreement includes an understanding that Mr. Fels would file a petition for statutory attorney's fees under the Act should Petitioner prevail but otherwise would not be compensated. The Retainer Agreement was entered into evidence at the July 2, 2020 hearing.

Mr. Fels and Petitioner did not have a professional relationship before the initiation of this litigation. Mr. Fels has not previously advertised his services as an attorney and has not previously charged for attorney fees prior to this litigation. The only discussion of fees and expenses and the rate to be charged between petitioner and Mr. Fels was within the Retainer Agreement and isolated to the discussion thereof.

After the initial litigation, Petitioner filed her motion to alter or amend that is now before the Court. She also filed a memorandum in conjunction with the motion. The memorandum includes an analysis of the factors as set out in RPC 1.5(a).

After Petitioner filed her motion to alter or amend, Dean Hill Rivkin entered his appearance, on behalf of Petitioner, for the purpose of assisting with Petitioner's motion to

include the amount of attorneys' fees. Petitioner and Mr. Rivkin entered into a Retainer Agreement like that between her and Mr. Fels.

Mr. Rivkin became substantially involved with the litigation for the award of attorneys' fees. Among other things, Mr. Rivkin filed a reply titled "Petitioner's Reply to County's Response in Opposition to Professor Conley's Motion for Attorney's Fees." He conducted the direct examination of Mr. Fels and argued Petitioner's motion to alter or amend.

The Court of Appeals, in *Little*, sets forth the procedure for a party requesting attorney's fees to prove the reasonableness of the requested fees. *Little*, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 at *12-13. Petitioner, in this case, followed that procedure. Petitioner presented "the affidavits of the lawyers who performed the work." Petitioner, through Mr. Rivkin, called Mr. Fels to testify and both attorneys, Mr. Fels and Mr. Rivkin, were available for cross-examination by Defendant. *See Id.* at *12-13. Petitioner also filed the declaration of Wade V. Davies, a local attorney, as to the reasonableness of Mr. Fels' billable hourly rates. Other than the cross examination of Mr. Fels, as to his fees, Defendant presented no evidence.

The Court of Appeals, in *Little*, refers to the Tennessee Supreme Court's general instructions "that a trial court should apply the factors set forth in RPC 1.5(a)(1)-(10) when determining a reasonable attorney's fee." *Id.* at *14. The factors are:

- (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
- (2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
- (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
- (4) The amount involved and the results obtained;

- (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
- (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
- (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;
- (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
- (9) Prior advertisements or statements by the lawyer with respect to the fees the lawyer charges; and
- (10) Whether the fee agreement is in writing.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.5(a)(1)-(10). Consistent with the Tennessee Supreme Court's general instructions above, this Court will apply the factors to this case. *See Id* at *14.

Before the Court applies the above factors, it must address Defendant's argument that an award of attorneys' fees is inappropriate for the proceedings upon the petition to recover attorney's fees, proceedings that are typically referred to as "fees on fees" proceedings. Defendant argues that the attorney's fees should be limited to the actual litigation of the original claims and should not be awarded for the additional litigation that resulted from the petition to recover attorney's fees. Defendant further argues that there is no statutory authority that allows for the recovery of the fees associated with the petition to recover fees under the Public Records Act. Stated differently, Defendant argues that no statutory or case law authority exists that allows the awarding of fees for the additional proceedings to recover attorney's fees. In summation of Defendant's argument, there is nothing in the statute that authorizes the recovery of "fees on fees" at the trial court level. Defendant argues that the fees should be limited to the costs specifically involved in obtaining the records as provided in the Court's order of April 29, 2020. If successful, this argument would essentially remove the entirety of Mr. Rivkin's petition for attorneys' fees because he was not present for the initial litigation but only for the litigation for the "fees on fees." For the reasons below, the Court cannot agree with this reading of the statute or case law.

The Court concludes that an award for attorney's fees is appropriate for "fees on fees" proceedings. The Court relies on the language from *Taylor v. Town of Lynnville*, No. M2016-01393-COA-R3-CV, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 469, 2017 WL 2984194 (Ct. App. July 13, 2017) where the Court of Appeals addressed a similar argument. That court stated: "[b]y implication, therefore, we held that it was appropriate to award costs incurred in litigating attorney's fees under the TPRA." *Taylor*, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 469 at *27. This statement was in reference to its previous decision where it implicitly upheld a trial court's decision to award attorneys' fees under the Act including "costs . . . incurred in applying for attorney fees." *Id.* (citing *Tennessean v. City of Leb.*, No. M2002-02078-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99, 2004 WL 290705 (Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2004)). The *Taylor* court recognized that the *Tennessean* court modified the trial court's order; however, the modification was only to "include [particular] fees that had been *excluded* by the trial court." *Id.* (emphasis in original). The *Taylor* court also noted that the trial court expressly ordered that the petitioner be reimbursed the costs incurred in applying for fees. *Id.* Therefore, it was implicitly held that it is appropriate to award costs incurred in litigating attorney's fees under the Act. *Id.* The *Taylor* court's enunciation of this statement raises the appropriateness of an award of this type of attorney's fees at the trial court level to something more than merely implicit. Thus, there is explicit authority in the case law that allows for the award of attorney's fees for "fees on fees" proceedings.

The Court now turns to the first factor involving the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly. This case did not turn upon one or two records requests as might be typical for public records cases but involved the navigation of a saga of requests and

denials. The litigation, on both sides, was consistently adversarial and required a thorough understanding of public records statutory and case law. The Court notes, however, as part of Mr. Fels time, he filed three motions that he subsequently withdrew.

As to the second factor, the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer, the Court finds that Mr. Fels serves in the legal community primarily as a law professor at the Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School of Law. He typically takes clients only on a *pro bono* basis. There is no evidence that Mr. Fels' services in this case caused him to lose other income.

As to the third factor, the fees customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, the reasonableness of Mr. Fels' hourly rate of \$250.00 is supported by the declaration of another local attorney and the Court's awareness of local rates. Defendant offered no evidence in opposition to the reasonableness of Mr. Fels hourly rate.

As to the fourth factor, the amount involved and the results obtained, Petitioner obtained relief which, among other things, required Defendant to revamp its criteria in evaluating records requests in general and in implementing a means for the public to access arrest records on a more current basis. The Court notes that although much of the case involved whether a governmental entity may assess redaction charges for the mere inspection of public records, no specific relief was required or granted on that issue. However, Defendant mentioned the availability of such charges in replying to Petitioner's records requests. Considering the obvious chilling effect of such potential charges upon requests for public records, the issue permeated the case as a whole.

As to the fifth factor, the limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances, there is nothing in the record to determine that Petitioner imposed a time limitation upon Mr. Fels. Petitioner had no liability to Mr. Fels for fees and, therefore, there was no risk of exhausting Petitioner's resources for the litigation. On the other hand, Petitioner could not obtain the records that she sought for her research until the conclusion of this litigation.

As to the sixth factor, the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, there was no professional relationship between Petitioner and Mr. Fels before this matter. Petitioner was referred to Mr. Fels by a friend in contemplation of this litigation.

As to the seventh factor, the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services, Mr. Fels is a relatively new attorney, having graduated from the University of Tennessee College of Law in 2017. He has not engaged in extensive representation of clients. Mr. Fels has utilized the Public Records Act to get information and has advised clients in that regard but had not tried a public records case before this one. Mr. Fels was recommended to Petitioner by a friend of Petitioner who knew that Mr. Fels had utilized the Act. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner engaged Mr. Fels based on his reputation.

As to the eighth factor, whether the fee is fixed or contingent, the fee in this case is of a hybrid nature. No fee comes from the client. The fee is contingent in the sense that the attorney would receive compensation only if the client prevailed and only if awarded a fee under the Act. For purposes of encouraging access to public records, this type of fee arrangement is commendable.

As to the ninth factor, prior advertisement or statements by the lawyer with respect to the fees the lawyer charges, there is no evidence of any advertisements or such statements by Mr. Fels. The only evidence of any discussion of fees between Mr. Fels and Petitioner is per their retainer agreement below.

As to the tenth factor, whether the fee agreement is in writing, the fee arrangement, discussed above, is in writing. The retainer agreement between petitioner and Mr. Fels was filed as an exhibit at the hearing on fees.

Mr. Rivkin joined Mr. Fels as co-counsel for Petitioner on Mr. Fels' application for fees. Upon questioning by the Court, Mr. Rivkin stated it was necessary for him to become co-counsel because of the awkwardness for an attorney in advocating, by himself, for his fees.

The factors as they pertain to Mr. Rivkin were given only limited attention by the parties. However, Mr. Rivkin filed his declaration. He also filed his statement of services with his declaration and his supplemental statement with Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Mr. Rivkin was available for examination by defendant.

Mr. Rivkin graduated from Vanderbilt University Law School in 1971. He is Professor Emeritus of the University of Tennessee College of Law, where he has been a professor since 1976. He has participated in many public interest law cases including those involving awards of statutory fees. He has consulted with and filed declarations on behalf of a number of lawyers on issues of statutory attorney's fees. His customary hourly rate is

\$450.00. The Court finds the rate to be reasonable for an attorney with Mr. Rivkin's experience and credentials in this community.


Respecting the factors applied above as to Mr. Fels, factors one, three, four, seven eight, and ten are favorable to the awarding of the fees sought by Mr. Rivkin. The record does not address factors two, five, six, and nine.

CONCLUSION

Considering all of the above, the Court finds and concludes that Petitioner is entitled to her statutory costs, including expenses and reasonable attorney's fees in the following amounts:

- (1) Expenses in the amount of \$2,805.25.
- (2) Attorney's fees for Andrew C. Fels, attorney at law, in the amount of \$55,762.50.
- (3) Attorney's fees for Dean Hill Rivkin, attorney at law, in the amount of \$19,440.00.

Signed this 24th day of November, 2020.


CHANCELLOR

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing was placed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid to:


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