KENNETH L. JAKES,
vs.
SUMNER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Defendant.


EXCERPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Before the Honorable Dee David Gay January 9, 2015

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PR O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Clements.
This might seem like a real nit-picky issue to some people, but it's really not. And the more $I$ review this, the more $I$ see the significance of the issue.

If we look at the agreed -- if we look at the agreed facts here, without getting into the policy issue, it's clear. Mr. Jakes requested, quote, "a public record request to inspect and review." That's the thing that he makes in the second request on March 31 st, "a public record request to inspect and review." The request is not for copies. And that could be by design; it could be by coincidence. I don't know. But $I$ think that is a significant factual issue that we must deal with that maybe has not been addressed anywhere else.

And then we have the response of Jeremy Johnson: "In keeping with our practice regarding open records requests" -- doesn't say anything about copies or anything else, open records requests, all requests -- "you will need to either submit your request in person" -- okay, that's fine
-- "or via the Postal Service." Does that comply with 10-7-503(a)(7)(A)?

And then we have the policy that was submitted. If I could see Exhibit No. 5: "Any citizen of Tennessee, state official, or other authorized person shall be permitted, upon written request, at a reasonable time, to inspect all records maintained by the school system unless otherwise prohibited by law." This policy concerns inspection. And it says that it must be on a written request. The issue is how does that 1 ine up with the first sentence of the law, "A records custodian may not require a written request or assess a charge to view a public record"? That is the issue.

Now, the first argument by the defendant here is somewhat interesting. Mr. Jakes goes on in the second paragraph: "If the records policy is online, you can simply provide the link." The defendant says it's online, and we don't have to provide this because it's online.

Well, I note, and is something that Mr. Clements alluded to: Why didn't he just say, Mr. Jakes, the 1 ink is such and such, you can go right there? Isn't that kind of in compliance with
the policy of the Open Records Act? And Mr.
Clements talks about motivation here. And then you come in and say it's online, but you didn't mention it in your response. And that doesn't make much sense to me, especially in light of 10-7-123, Electronic Access to Government Information, (a)(4): "Once a remote electronic access information system is in place, access must be given to all members of the public who desire access to such records." You didn't give him access.

This particular statute here, it doesn't appear that it was complied with. It would have been easy to give him access. It says access must be given to all members of the public who desire such access. You didn't do it. If you'd have done it, we wouldn't be here.

I just don't think it's fair. I don't think it's equitable. I don't think it's right to say this case is moot on the grounds that the information is available online, and yet the defendant didn't say a word or provide access, did nothing to follow up.

You know this court, Chancery Court, has equitable jurisdiction, and it just doesn't smell right. And $I$ 'm not going to allow this to be
moot simply when everything was under the control of the defendant, and the defendant doesn't do anything until you come into court.
Next, 10-7-503(a)(7)(A), we cannot --
we cannot overlook this particular language of the law. The language is clear, the intent is clear, and the law must be followed, and it can't be changed unless the legislature does it. And the law states, quote, "A records custodian may not require a written request or assess a charge to view a public record unless otherwise required." This tells me in straight language you must accept a request by any means to view or inspect.

Now, I'm not going to be here telling the Board of Education what they've got to do, but al 1 I know is that they may not require a written request. They can do anything other than require a written request.

It goes on to say that "this section
shall be broadly construed so as to give the fullest possible public access to public records."

Going on, the Best Practice
Guidelines, Guidelines 1, last paragraph: The policy adopted by a government entity should balance. "The governmental entities need to
function efficiently and to maintain the integrity of records with the public's right to access such records."

A governmental need to function
efficiently is something that we need to look at. An interesting case in that extreme is the case of Byron Wells v. A. C. Wharton, Jr., 2005 WL 3309651. You talk about problems on Shelby County government. Byron Wells was a resident of Shelby County who previously accessed public documents via the Shelby County Portal website. Using a computer program that he specially created, Mr. Wells would download public documents in bulk format.

After access through the website overloaded its computer system, the Shelby County Government had to close the website for several weeks. That's pretty demanding, and it destroys the need for a governmental entity to function efficiently. And we hear other examples of that extreme.
And then there is another extreme
here, to maintain the integrity of the records with a public's right to access records. When somebody comes in, has a legitimate request to see public records in the United States of America, that should
be provided. And anybody that's a public officer should treat their duties as a public officer as if 60 Minutes is looking over their right shoulder on audio and video. And anybody that's in public office that doesn't want to do that, they shouldn't be in office.

So you've got to maintain a balance here. And looking at this case, there's not much here a burden on the school board.

You go down to paragraph number three: "A records custodian should make requested records available as promptly as possible in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 10-7-503." Why in the world did you not say the link is on such and such, and then take care of it?

Number four: "A records custodian should strive to respond to all records requests in the most economical and efficient manner possible." Why didn't you say so on the e-mail, that there was a link? "To the extent possible, when records are maintained electronically, records custodians should produce records request electronically."

It goes on to just stand for the proposition that you want to make public records available as quickly as possible, as less burdensome
as possible, considering the problems of the load that is placed on that particular governmental agency, and that is not the case here.

But, lastly, $I$ want to look again at the case of Wells v. A. C. Wharton at 2005 WL 3309651. I read you a little bit about this situation, but it's the only case $I$ could find that's right on point.

He filed a lawsuit -- Mr. Wells filed a lawsuit against A. C. Wharton, Jr., everybody in Shelby County. And also he alleged that the defendant's requirement that $M r$. Wells must first present a written request before being allowed public access constituted a denial of access to public records.

If you look at the opinion, the
"Issues Presented" section, issue No. 7, "Whether appellees may require any request for public records to be in writing," on page 5 of the opinion, it says and holds -- this was from the Court of Appeals opinion by Alan Highers with David Farmer and Holly Kirby, who is now Supreme Court Justice:
(Reading)
"Section 10-7-503 of the Tennessee Code requires that a county official may not refuse
inspection of any public record to any citizen of Tennessee unless otherwise provided by state law. If a citizen has been denied access to public records by a government official, that citizen may petition for access to any such record and to obtain judicial review of the actions taken to deny the access. This Court must broadly construe this section of the Tennessee Code so as to give the fullest possible public access to public records." This was a Rule 12 motion and then they went on to state:
(Reading)
"Appellant, a resident of Shelby County, has requested payment records from transactions conducted between the Memphis Daily News and Shelby County. Clearly, these records fall within the definition of a public record. If we view his allegations as true, appellant, a citizen of Tennessee, has been denied access to public records. Thus, appellant has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted."

I find, therefore, that the plaintiff here has stated a claim. And in looking at the words of Rule 56, I do find that there's no genuine issue as to any material fact, but $I$ do find that
the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of 1 aw. Therefore, respectful1y, the motion for summary judgment wil1 be denied.

Now, as $I$ stated, $I$ don't think we need to do much else. I don't think we need to be in 1 itigation. $I$ don't think we need to be in depositions. I don't think we need to do interrogatories. You know, sometimes we make things more complicated than they real1y are. I'm ready to move.

I wil 11 not grant any motion to compe1, any further discovery. We don't need it. And I wi11, to the extent of where we are in this particular 1 awsuit, grant a protective order because we don't need any further discovery. I don't think we need to make this more complicated than what it is.

And I've stated for the record here the legal issue that is ripe. With that in mind, Mr. Clements, do you have any idea - do we need to schedule this for declaratory judgment? Do we need to schedule a trial? What do you suggest?

MR. CLEMENTS: We11, Your Honor --
THE COURT: A11 I've done up to this point is deny the motion for summary judgment to the
moving party.

MR. CLEMENTS: We11, if we're not
al 1 owed to perform any additional discovery,
frankly, I guess I'11 have to speak with

Mr. Presne11 and see if can admit to some facts. If we can't, then just set it for a hearing - a trial. But the problem with that, I guess, Your Honor, is if we have a trial, then, with my 1 imited discovery, I don't know that $I^{\prime} m$ going to be fully prepared.

THE COURT: We11, I've stated the
issue pretty clear.
MR. CLEMENTS: I understand.
THE COURT: I mean, it doesn't get any
clearer here. And $I$ don't know what else you need.
I mean, as far as motivations, opinions, who did what, who knew what, when and where -- I mean, this isn't Watergate. This is pretty simple.

MR. CLEMENTS: We11, again, then $I^{\prime} d$ suggest --

THE COURT: Would you 1 ike for me to give you al 1 time to talk or do you want me to go ahead and schedule a trial date? I'11 do whatever you al 1 want to do. I think there's an
interlocutory appeal situation here. I don't want to keep you a11 from doing that. I just kind of
want input. I want to accommodate you.
MR. PRESNELL: Judge, you're right.
The denial of my motion just means that the case proceeds. I think the next logical step would be, under the statute, is to schedule a show cause hearing. The Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, do allow us 30 days to seek an interlocutory appeal, which I suspect we will be doing here on this.

THE COURT: Let's kind of have a
status hearing in 30 days and see where we are, because anything that $I$ said might be moot.

Now, I'm going to look to the
attorneys for advice here. I did not grant the motion for summary judgment. Am $I$ still required under the rules to submit an order of conclusions -findings of fact and conclusions of law?

MR. PRESNELL: You are, Judge. And the 30 days for the interlocutory appeal will begin running when Your Honor enters that order.

THE COURT: Okay. I've got an order pending now on 43 wiretap cases on discovery. I'11 get this done.

MR. CLEMENTS: Your Honor, I'm happy to draft - I mean, you went through in detail the basis of your finding. I'm happy to draft it.

THE COURT: Why don't you all see if you can draft something that $I$ said. I made it pretty specific. You've even got an available transcript to help you. That will help me immensely. If you all could do that, I sure would appreciate it.

MR. CLEMENTS: I will do that.
MR. PRESNELL: Your Honor, we can also take the chore of drafting your order on the other motions, the motions to amend and the discovery motions.

THE COURT: That would be great. I appreciate it.

Okay. February 9th is a date that I had a jury trial scheduled and it's been continued. Any time during that day is open. Do the attorneys have any special requests as to whether it's in the morning or afternoon?

MR. CLEMENTS: Your Honor, I don't have my calendar with me. Are you talking about a status conference on the phone?

THE COURT: Yes, we can maybe do it on the phone. That be okay?

MR. CLEMENTS: I should be able to do that.

MR. PRESNELL: I'm the same way.

THE COURT: I'11 do a status
conference ca11. Let's make it at 2:00, and I'11 do that 1 ike we did the other phone ca11.

Anything else we need to address?
MR. CLEMENTS: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I want
to comment and thank the attorneys for your professionalism and the way that you've handied arguments here in court, and we'11 be in recess.

END OF PROCEEDING.

C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF TENNESSEE )
) SS.
COUNTY OF SUMNER )
I, GLORIA J. DILLARD, LCR \#241, 1icensed court reporter and notary public in and for the State of Tennessee, do hereby certify that the above hearing was reported by me and that the foregoing 15 pages of the transcript is a true and accurate record to the best of my knowledge, skills, and ability.

I further certify that $I$ am not related to nor an employee of counsel or any of the parties to the action, nor am $I$ in any way financially interested in the outcome of this case.

I further certify that $I$ am duly $1 i c e n s e d$ by the Tennessee Board of Court Reporting as a Licensed Court Reporter as evidenced by the LCR number and expiration date following my name below.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal this $16 t h$ day of January, 2015.

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December 21, 2015
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| ```11:22, 12:22, 13:5 scheduled [1] - 14:15 school [2] - 4:8, 8:9 second [1] - 4:18 Section [2]-8:13, 9:24 section [3] - 6:19, 9:17, 10:8 see [5] - 4:4, 7:24, 12:5, 13:10, 14:1 seek [1]-13:7 sense [1] - 5:5 sentence [1]-4:12 service [1] - 4:1 set \([1]-12: 6\) several [1]-7:16 shall \({ }^{[2]}\) - 4:6, 6:20 Shelby [7]-7:8, 7:9,``` | ```8:13, 9:24, 10:2, 10:8, 10:19 THE [11]-11:24, 12:10, 12:13, 12:20, 13:9, 13:20, 14:1, 14:12, 14:22, 15:2, 15:7 therefore [2]-10:22, 11:2 they've [1] - 6:15 three [1]-8:10 transactions [1] - 10:15 transcript [1] - 14:4 treat [1]-8:2 trial [5]-11:22, 12:6, 12:8, 12:22, 14:15 true [1]-10:18``` |
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| $\begin{aligned} & \text { stand }[1]-8: 23 \\ & \text { state }[3]-4: 5,10: 2, \\ & 10: 11 \\ & \text { states }[1]-6: 9 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { via }[2]-4: 1,7: 10 \\ & \text { video }[1]-8: 4 \\ & \text { view }[4]-4: 14,6: 10, \\ & 6: 13,10: 18 \end{aligned}$ |
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| $\begin{aligned} & \text { statute }[2]-5: 11,13: 5 \\ & \text { step }[1]-13: 4 \\ & \text { still }[1]-13: 14 \\ & \text { straight }[1]-6: 12 \\ & \text { strive }[1]-8: 17 \\ & \text { submit }[1]-13: 15 \\ & \text { submitted }[1]-4: 4 \\ & \text { suggest }[2]-11: 22 \text {, } \\ & 12: 19 \\ & \text { summary }[3]-11: 3 \text {, } \\ & 11: 25,13: 14 \\ & \text { Supreme }[1]-9: 22 \\ & \text { suspect }[1]-13: 8 \\ & \text { system }[3]-4: 8,5: 7, \\ & 7: 15 \end{aligned}$ | ```Watergate [1] - 12:17 website [3]-7:11, 7:14, 7:16 weeks [1]-7:17 Wells [6]-7:7, 7:9, 7:12, 9:5, 9:9, 9:12 Wharton [3]-7:7, 9:5, 9:10 wiretap [1] - 13:21 WL [2]-7:7, 9:5 word [1]-5:21 words [1] - 10:24 world [1] - 8:14 writing [1]-9:19 written [7]-4:6, 4:11, 4:13, 6:10, 6:16, 6:18, 9:13``` |

